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C
onsumers are confronted by more
product categories and increasing
number of brands per category to-
day compared to ten years ago. A
quick glance at a store’s shelf would find at
least 13 brands of sardines, 8 brands of milk,
and 5 brands of detergent soap, all vying for
consumer attention and patronage. How these
goods reach the household shelves largely de-
pends on how the supermarket retailer posi-
tions them in its shelf space. This retailing prac-
tice implicitly invokes competition among the
manufacturers for the limited amount of store
space. Evidence of this kind of competition is
inferred from the growing, albeit overlooked,
practice of slotting allowances or shelf space
rental fees. The rapid product proliferation,
combined with limited shelf space, can signifi-
cantly shift the balance of power away from
the manufacturers and transfer it to the retailers.
Slotting allowances are payments made by
manufacturers to retailers in order to have their
products displayed on the store shelves. The
fees include shelf-space fees, display fees, pay-
to-stay fees, failure fees, and others. These are
often referred as lump-sum, up-front fees paid
for stocking the products, especially the new
ones. Pay-to-stay fees are also collected for ma-
tured products to sustain customer patronage
and increase market share. This unregulated
business practice emerged in the European and
American markets with the rise of the large
chain stores in the 1980s, starting with depart-
ment supermarkets and spreading to other
stores that sell electronics, books, medicines,
and computer software. Prices are negotiated
in secrecy appearing in different names and
forms (Schaffer 1991).
This Policy Notes focuses on this relatively
unexplored business phenomenon. Specifi-PN 2006-07
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cally, it informs the consumers that the prac-
tice of charging shelf-space rental fee is a po-
tential source of retailer power that may yield
positive and negative consequences. Two di-
vergent views on slotting allowance are pre-
sented: (1) the efficiency gain principle, and
(2) the anticompetitive prospect. While it is the
concern of policymakers to protect the wel-
fare of consumers, the same kind of protec-
tion must also be extended to the producers
(or manufacturers) with the objective of achiev-
ing a positive welfare gain for society in the
short and long run.
The Philippine retail market:
a synopsis
The Philippine economy grew at an average
rate of 4.9 percent for the period 2000-2005
(Figure 1). The steady increase in output per-
formance from 2001 until 2005 was mainly
due to the sterling performance of the service
sector, which was propelled by the dynamic
retail trade sector. Despite lingering inflation
and recurring oil price hikes, the retail trade
sector continues to experience output growth
and shows off its resiliency during economic
cycles. Retail trading accounts for more than
20 percent of gross national output and over
75 percent of the total trade sector. From a
share of 20.8 percent in 1996, its contribution
to output reached a high of 28.4 percent in
1998, with revenue steadily increasing from
P4.5 million in 1996 to P8.2 million in 1998.
Retail sales as a component of consumer ex-
penditure have likewise been on an uphill
trend. From 28.4 percent in 1996, it rose to
38.4 percent in 1998 and possibly as high as
61 percent in 2003.1 The spurt in retail sales is
fueled by the country’s expanding consumer
base and growing personal consumption ex-
penditure. With an annual population growth
rate of 2.4 percent, the country’s current popu-
lation of 80 million Filipinos complements
well for the retail industry where much of the
consumer expenditures are on food and per-
sonal products like clothing and footwear, and
transportation and communication. As of 2004,
the country has over 442 malls, 780 supermar-
kets, 796 convenience stores, 4,162 groceries,
7,300 drugstores, 39,000 market stalls, and
more than 448,000 sari-sari stores.2 Taken col-
lectively, there are over 500,000 retail estab-
lishments catering to the spending needs and
whims of 80 million Filipinos.
In March 2000, the Retail Trade Act was en-
acted wherein the retail sector was liberalized.
This policy initiative allowed foreign retailers
to set up operations in the Philippines. Popu-
lar foreign names like Wal-Mart and Carré Four
dominated the retail scene with promises of
wider array of products, lower
prices, and alternative shop-
ping pleasures. After five years
though, not a single store of
these giant foreign retailers has
landed on Philippine soil. In-
stead, what the Filipinos had
witnessed is the rise and pro-
liferation of local retailer SM
all over the urban areas. From
______________
1 Based on Euromonitor estimates.
2 BusinessWorld (2004) Source: National Income Accounts
Figure 1. Growth of GDP, services, and retail sector, 1996-2005 (in percent)PN 2006-07 Policy Notes
3 Luzon to Mindanao, SM made its mark in key
urban cities with its signature box-type archi-
tecture fashioned with a new color combina-
tion of neon green and bright orange aimed to
attract a younger and wider genre of shoppers.
Indeed, the dominance of SM, together with
another retailer giant Robinson, cannot be de-
nied (Figure 2).
The retailer does not simply put goods on the
shelves for the consumer to purchase. His func-
tions are much broader and include manag-
ing relationships with manufacturers, manag-
ing logistics such as distribution and inventory,
and developing and sustaining customer rela-
tionship (Dueñas-Caparas 2005).
The retailer in focus: a certified
two-timer?
Products flow from one producer to many con-
sumers through the retailers. This essentially
implies that the retailer caters to two markets:
the distribution and intermediate markets (Fig-
ure 3).
The distribution market is where goods flow
from the retailer to the consumer. A retailer
gains competitive edge over its rivals if the
products it sells are priced relatively lower than
others. This can be achieved through cost effi-
ciency, and economies of scale and scope.
However, consumers also consider other fac-
tors in their choice of retailer. First is the geo-
graphical location of the retail outlet. The prox-
imity of the retail outlet to the consumer high-
lights the convenience in making purchases
even if product prices are slightly higher. An-
other dimension of retail competition is the
product selection a retailer carries. Competi-
tive advantage increases if the retailer is able
to stock the best product range at reasonable
prices. Knowledge on consumer needs and on
market operations are necessary tools to
achieve this advantage. The last dimension of
Figure 2. SM malls/outlets, greater Metro Manila area, 1999-2006PN 2006-07
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retail competition is the provision of an effec-
tive and efficient retail service. A retailer must
also know and consider how to present said
products. Shop ambiance, point-of-sale service
and after-sales service are some retail services
that nurture loyalty among consumers.
In the intermediate market, goods flow from
the producers/manufacturers to the retailers.3
The relationship between the retailer and
manufacturer involves a two-way traffic, with
the supply chain on one side and product man-
agement on the other. Retailers have the ten-
dency to get involved in the supply chain for
various reasons: (1) to ensure that the products
are delivered to the shops on time and are of
desirable quality, (2) to reduce the costs in-
curred when products are stocked in the
retailer’s warehouses, and (3) to maintain a
reputation of exclusivity where the manufac-
turer will not supply to other retailers. If retail-
ers tend to get involved in the supply chain
management, the manufacturers also have rea-
sons to exert particular control over some as-
pects of retailing. In particular, the manufac-
turers want assurance that: (1)
products are retailed appropri-
ately, (2) staffs of the retailers are
properly trained, (3) retailers carry
out the right level and type of pro-
motion, and (4) product’s physi-
cal position within the store is in
preferred locations.
A close interdependence exists be-
tween the two markets. The
retailer’s share in the distribution
market determines the volume of
procurement from the manufac-
turers where a bigger distribution
share requires larger procurement
volume. The larger volume in turn
brings a more favorable buying
condition from the manufacturers
which can be converted into ways
to improve the retailer’s position in the distri-
bution market.
Retailer power:  shelf space anyone?
Product categories are increasing almost ev-
ery year. Shampoo is now retailed in sachets
to address consumers’ varying needs. As these
product categories increase, so does the num-
ber of brands that go along with them. Mar-
keting these brands is one challenge a manu-
facturer faces, but making these products physi-
cally accessible to the consumer is an even
tougher task.
Since it is rare, though possible, that a manu-
facturer directly sells it products, the task of
making these products accessible to the con-
sumer rests on the shoulders of a retailer.4 Es-
sentially, the retailers become producers or sup-
pliers of store and shelf spaces.
Producers  Producers 
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Figure 3. Flow of goods at the procurement and distribution levels
Source: Mazarotto (2001)
______________
3 In the Philippine setting, manufacturers usually have a
distributor and do not directly deal with the retailers.
4 For this article, the retailer is narrowly classified as super-
market/grocery operators.PN 2006-07 Policy Notes
5 Traditional economic tools of
analysis state that if there are
suppliers of shelf space (the re-
tailers) and there are those
who demand it (the manufac-
turers), exchange of goods and
services takes place when both
parties agree on the price.
Consider the case when there
is a limited supply of good (re-
tailers do not expand shop
space fluidly) and the demand
for that good increases (more
brands coming out that have
to be displayed). The result is
an upward pressure for prices
to go up. In the intermediate
market (market for manufac-
turers and retailers), this price
is reflected in the slotting al-
lowances and becomes a pos-
sible source of power for the
retailer (or buyer).
The practice of charging slotting allowance is
currently generating discussion and serious in-
vestigation in the European market. The rea-
son is simple. Many regard it as a facilitating
measure where large retailers can elicit (inter-
mediate) market power, effectively transferring
the profit from the manufacturers to the large
retailer. Retail power argument suggests that
in many local markets, high retail concentra-
tion implies concentrated shelf space owner-
ship in the hands of few retailers, enabling
them to demand slotting allowances. This
means the manufacturers are at the mercy of
the retailers. If and when the manufacturers
fail to deliver the demands of the retailers, this
could lead to nonexposure of the product in
the retail shop and lesser product variety for
the consumers.
Some analysts, however, believe that there are
efficiency gains in charging slotting fees which
Table 1.  Two views on slotting allowance
Efficiency-enhancing Arguments Anticompetitive Rationale
Retailers charge slotting fees to distribute their limited Slotting allowance is an exercise of market
shelf spaces more efficiently.   power by large retailers and serves as a
facilitating device for the oligopoly retailers,
resulting in higher retail prices.
New products run the risk of failing to penetrate the Retailers use slotting allowances to extract
consumer market. Retailers carry the risk of marketing manufacturer profits by exercising retail
failure and unsold inventory. By charging slotting fees, power, thus adversely affecting smaller
the risk is passed on to the manufacturers who manufacturers and reducing consumer
introduced the new product, forming an insurance access to products.
against the risks.
Retailers carry the high quality-strong demand product
with or without the slotting fee since this will increase
revenue. The reverse is true for poor quality products—
the retailer will not carry a poor quality product even if it
charges shelf space fee. Hence, information carried out
by charging shelf space fee only covers the uncertainty
on product quality and demand.
Source:  Wang 2001
______________
5 Name of person interviewed and retail establishment with-
held as requested.
minimize the risks in retailing. For consumers
shopping at big retailers, slotting allowance is
beneficial because the big retailer may be able
to depress the consumer price in order to play
stiff competition against its closest rivals. This
can be done by negotiating a low wholesale
price (say, up to the marginal cost of the manu-
facturer) or favorable wholesale agreements
(like one box free for every 10 boxes). Table 1
presents the two divergent views on slotting
allowance.
What is the score of slotting
allowance in the Philippines?
Some Filipino big retailers are charging slot-
ting allowance. Below are some information
gathered from an interview conducted with a
big retailer operator.5PN 2006-07
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z Generally, there are three basic categories
in grocery retailing: (1) food, (2) nonfood,
and (3) fresh and frozen.
z The food section includes processed meat
and fruits, bread, milk, breakfast items, and
the like. In the nonfood section, it includes
toiletries, cleaning agents, house decors,
and kitchen items. Fresh and frozen sec-
tion is the wet market area where one can
get unprocessed chicken, pork, fish, and
beef.
z Each section has a gondola or a rack where
products are put on display. Rental fee for
each rack depends on the pace of product
turnover and the position of the rack in
the selling area.
z Retailers carry the products either on con-
signment basis or outright purchase. Goods
on consignment can be returned to the
manufacturers if they did not leave the rack
for a specified period of time while out-
right purchased goods are products that are
purchased by the retailers. Normally,
goods on consignment are charged shelf-
space rental fee while the latter are not.
z Shelf-space rental fee is lower in the non-
food section compared to the food section.
One gondola for a nonfood item costs ap-
proximately P1,500 to P2,500 per month.
z End racks have higher rental fees since they
are the most ideal location and highlight
the product. Food items are charged as high
as P27,000 per month in shelf-space rental.
z In some cases, manufacturers comply with
the slotting allowance but the suggested
retail price (SRP) is negotiated with the re-
tailers in order to protect the manufactur-
ers’ share in the consumer market.
z Bar codes are sold for P0.25 per product
in case the manufacturers do not have the
codes placed in the goods.
z Some retailers have affiliated companies
related to manufacturing. In these cases,
products of the affiliated companies have
preference in shelf space location over their
competitors.
Slotting allowance: what now?
Consumers are primarily concerned with prices
and choices while producers are interested
with profits. These matters are greatly influ-
enced by how the retailers perform their func-
tions and effectively distribute
the goods from one end to the
other.
From the consumers’ perspec-
tive, the practice of charging
shelf space fee may elicit an
indifferent attitude so long as
it does not increase prices and
lessen product variety. If retail-
ers are able to partake of the
manufacturers’ profits because
of slotting allowance, the
transfer of profit from the
manufacturer to the retailer
would likely have little effect
on the consumer as long as the
retailer meets the expectations
of the consumer. The manu-
Box 1. The European retailing experience
The European policymakers impose some restrictions in retailing. Some of these
are (1) zoning regulations, (2) opening hours, (3) marketing techniques, and (4)
interactions between retailers and suppliers. Generally, rigid zoning laws are
imposed that prevent the entry of new retailing formats with efficient scales of
operation. In the British market, there are technically no zoning laws but in prac-
tice, they are used vigorously to prevent new large stores or malls from developing
to undermine the existing retail base. In Germany, there are restrictive zoning
laws but the most important regulation covers the operations of retailers, in par-
ticular, the opening hours. In France, there are laws restricting the operation of
larger stores.
Some analysts consider these regulations as factors that hindered the competi-
tive evolution of the retail industry and delayed the diffusion of innovations or
changes in the structure of general merchandise retailing.
Source: Baily (1993)PN 2006-07 Policy Notes
7 facturers, on the other hand, may regard slot-
ting allowance as a facilitating device.
Whether or not the retailer charges these fees,
the manufacturer is confronted with options
that will affect his objective of maximizing
profit.
Figure 4 shows the process and mechanism
through which slotting allowance could affect
manufacturer and consumer welfare. Inspite
of the arguments favoring slotting fee, the
simple flow chart details three possible alarm-
ing outcomes with the incidence of slotting
fees: (1) reduction of product variety, (2) higher
retail prices, and (3) low retail prices but un-
fair competition in the distribution market.
These outcomes can be complicated further
depending on the structure of the distribution
industry. The degree of market concentration
suggests the amount of buying power a retailer
can exercise. A highly concentrated market can
elicit larger buyer power through bulk or vol-
ume purchases. While large retailers could
yield countervailing measures and lower con-
sumer prices in the short run, it poses tough
competition against relatively smaller retailers
where the lower prices undercut smaller stores
and eventually drive them out of business.6
Figure 4. Possible effects of slotting fees
______________
6 Recall that large retailers can offer lower consumer prices
because they are able to negotiate a favorable wholesale
price resulting from bulk purchases. The same cannot be
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Unfortunately, this issue is not addressed by
the existing Retail Trade Act in the country. The
Act mainly addresses competition issues in the
distribution market—from the retailer to the
consumer—and does not deal with manufac-
turer–retailer relationship. The Act allows the
entry of foreign players to operate in the retail
business with the thrust of making the market
more efficient. With more players in the in-
dustry, the goal was to lower consumer prices
and increase product variety. However, this did
not happen because the expected entry of for-
eign players did not materialize. Instead, cer-
tain local retailers became even bigger and
more dominant with their substantial invest-
ment and knowledge in the local market there-
upon affecting the size and structure of the dis-
tribution market.
In view of the above, it may be the right time
to review the existing Retail Trade Act and see
how it can address issues relating to manufac-
turer–retailer relatioship that eventually affects
the distribution market structure. 
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